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Abstract—Much attention has been devoted to verifying
software integrity of remote embedded (IoT) devices. Many
techniques, with different assumptions and security guarantees,
have been proposed under the common umbrella of so-called
Remote Attestation (RA). Aside from software integrity verification
and malware presence detection, RA serves as a foundation
for many security services, such proofs of as memory erasure,
system reset, software update, and runtime verification. All
prior RA techniques verify the remote device’s state at the
time when RA functionality is executed, thus providing no
information about the device’s state before current RA execution
or between consecutive RA executions. This implies that presence
of transient malware may be undetected. In other words, if
transient malware infects a device, performs its nefarious tasks,
and leaves before the next attestation, its temporary presence will
not be detected. This important problem, called Time-Of-Check-
Time-Of-Use (TOCTOU), is well-known in the research literature
and remains unaddressed in the context of RA.
In this work, we propose Remote Attestation with TOCTOU
Avoidance (RATA): a provably secure approach to address the
RA TOCTOU problem. With RATA, even malware that erases
itself before execution of the next RA, can not hide its ephemeral
presence. RATA targets hybrid RA architectures (implemented
as Hardware/Software co-designs), which are aimed at low-
end embedded devices. We present two alternative techniques
– RATAA and RATAB – suitable for devices with and without
real-time clocks, respectively. Each is shown to be secure and
accompanied by a publicly available and formally verified imple-
mentation. Our evaluation demonstrates low hardware overhead
of both techniques. Compared with current RA architectures
– that offer no TOCTOU protection – RATA incurs no extra
runtime overhead. In fact, RATA substantially reduces compu-
tational costs of RA execution.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last two decades, in many aspects of everyday life,
our society is becoming increasingly surrounded by, and de-
pendent upon, a multitude of small and specialized computing
devices that perform a wide range of functions. They are often
referred to as embedded, “smart”, CPS or IoT devices, and they
range very widely in terms of computing abilities. However,
regardless of the purpose and resources, they have become
popular targets for malicious exploits and malware.
At the low-end of the spectrum, such devices are designed
with strict constraints on monetary cost, physical size, and en-
ergy consumption. Two prominent examples are: TI MSP4301
and Atmel ATMega AVR2. It is unrealistic to expect such de-
vices to have sophisticated means (similar to those on laptops
or smartphones) to prevent compromise or malware presence
via sophisticated security tools. In this landscape, Remote
1http://www.ti.com/microcontrollers/msp430-ultra-low-power-mcus/
applications.html
2https://www.microchip.com/design-centers/8-bit/avr-mcus
Attestation (RA) emerged as an inexpensive means to detect
malware presence on remote low-end devices. In addition, RA
serves as a foundation for other important security services,
such as provable software updates [1], control-flow integrity
verification [2], and proofs of remote software execution [3].
Loosely speaking, RA allows a trusted entity, called a Verifier
(Vrf), to ascertain memory integrity of an untrusted remote
device, called Prover (Prv). As shown in Figure 1, RA is
typically realized as a (deceptively) simple challenge-response
protocol:
1) Vrf sends an attestation request with a (random) challenge
(Chal) to Prv. This request might also contain a token
derived from a secret that allows Prv to authenticate Vrf.
2) Prv receives the request and computes a Chal-based au-
thenticated integrity check over its memory. The attested
memory region might be pre-defined (e.g., entire program
memory), or explicitly specified in the request.
3) Prv returns the result to Vrf.
4) Vrf receives the result and checks whether it corresponds
to a valid memory state.
Prv
Vrf
Authenticated integrity check
req
re
sp
Fig. 1. Timeline of a typical RA protocol
The authenticated integrity check is typically implemented
as a Message Authentication Code (MAC) over Prv’s attested
memory region. However, computing a MAC requires Prv to
have a unique secret key, denoted by K– a symmetric key
shared with Vrf or a private key for which the corresponding
public key is known to Vrf. (In the rest of this paper, we
assume the former, even though the differences are insignif-
icant.) K must reside in secure storage, inaccessible to any
software running on Prv, except for privileged attestation code.
Since the usual RA threat model assumes a fully compromised
software state on Prv, secure storage implies some level of
hardware support. Hybrid RA (based on hardware/software co-
designs) [4], [5], [6], [7] is an approach particularly suitable
for low-end embedded devices. In hybrid RA designs, the
integrity ensuring function is implemented in software, while
hardware controls execution of this software, detecting any
violations that might cause unexpected behavior or K leakage.
In a nutshell, hybrid RA provides the same security guarantees
as (more expensive) hardware-based RA approaches (e.g.,
those based on a TPM [8]), while minimizing modifications to
underlying hardware platform. We overview a concrete hybrid
RA architecture in Section II-C.
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Unfortunately, current hybrid RA architectures share a
common limitation: they only measure Prv’s state at the
time when RA code is executed by Prv. They provide no
information about Prv’s state before RA execution or its
state between two consecutive RA executions. We refer to
this problem as Time-Of-Check Time-Of-Use or TOCTOU.
This problem has been widely discussed in the research
literature [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]. Nonetheless, it remains
unsolved, leaving devices vulnerable to transient malware
which erases itself either after completing its tasks, or upon
detecting an incoming RA request.
In this paper, we study the TOCTOU problem and propose
approaches to guarantee security against related attacks, with-
out sacrificing security and performance of the underlying RA
architecture. Our approach is rooted in the observation that
current hybrid RA techniques use trusted hardware only to
detect security violations that might compromise execution of
RA software itself and taking action (e.g, resetting the device)
if such a violation is detected. Whereas, RATA’s main new
feature is the use of a minimal (formally verified) hardware
component to additionally provide historical context about
Prv’s memory state. This is achieved via secure logging of the
timing of memory modifications in a protected memory region
that is also covered by RA’s integrity ensuring function. This
enables Vrf to check authenticity and integrity of Prv’s mem-
ory modifications. This new feature is integrated seamlessly
into the underlying RA architecture and the composition is
shown to be secure. We believe this results in the following
contributions:
• RA TOCTOU-Security formulation: We motivate and
formalize TOCTOU in the context of RA. We define
RA TOCTOU-Security using a security game (see
Definition 3) and discuss why current RA techniques
based on consecutive self-measurements do not satisfy
this definition. We believe this to be the first systematic
treatment of this matter. Furthermore, we analyze
practicality of consecutive self-measurement approaches
and argue that using them to obtain TOCTOU-Security
incurs extremely high runtime overhead, possibly starving
benign applications on Prv.
• RATA Design, Implementation & Verification: Next,
we propose two techniques – RATAA and RATAB .
RATAA assumes that Prv has a secure read-only Real-
Time Clock (RTC) synchronized with Vrf. Since this
assumption is unrealistic for many low-end Prv-s, we
propose RATAB which avoids the need for a clock
in return for authentication of Vrf’s attestation requests;
this feature is already included in several hybrid RA
architectures.
We also show that both proposed techniques satisfy the
formal definition of TOCTOU-Security, assuming that their
implementations adhere to a set of formal specifica-
tions, stated in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL). Finally,
the implementation itself is formally verified to adhere
to these LTL specifications, yielding security at both
design and implementation levels. Our implementations
(publicly available at [14]) target a real-world low-end
microcontroller (MCU) – TI MSP430 – and are deployed
using commodity FPGAs. Experimental results show low
hardware overhead, affordable even for cost-sensitive low-
end devices. They also require no extra runtime. In fact,
we demonstrate that, most of the times, RATA can
significantly reduce overall RA runtime (see below).
• RATA Enhancements to RA and Related Services:
We discuss the implications of RATA on RA and related
services beyond TOCTOU-Security. In particular, we show
that RATA can, in most cases, reduce RA computational
complexity from linear (in terms of attested memory size)
to constant time, resulting in significant savings for RA
and related services. We also discuss RATA’s benefits for
specialized RA applications: (i) real-time systems; and
(ii) collective RA, where a multitude of provers need to
be attested simultaneously.
A. Scope
Detection Vs. Prevention: As a detection-oriented security
service,RA does not prevent future malware infections. There-
fore, the term TOCTOU should be considered in retrospective.
In particular, techniques presented in this paper allow Vrf to
understand “since when” Prv’s memory remained the same
as reported in the present RA execution result. As discussed
earlier, methods to prevent malware are either too expensive
or too restrictive for low-end devices considered in this paper.
Low-End Devices: This work focuses on CPS/IoT/smart
sensors and actuators (or hybrids thereof) with relatively low
computing power. They are some of the smallest and weakest
devices based on low-power single-core MCUs with only a
few KBytes of program and data memory. Two prominent
examples are: Atmel AVR ATmega and TI MSP430: 8- and
16-bit CPUs, typically running at 1-16MHz clock frequencies,
with ≈ 64 KBytes of addressable memory. SRAM is used
as data memory with the size normally ranging between 4
and 16KBytes, while the rest of address space is available for
program memory. Such devices execute instructions in place
(in physical memory) and have no memory management unit
(MMU) to support virtual memory.
Our implementation is based on MSP430. This choice is
due to public availability of a well-maintained open-source
MSP430 hardware design from Open Cores [15]. Nevertheless,
our machine model and the entire methodology developed in
this paper are applicable to other low-end MCUs in the same
class, such as Atmel AVR ATmega. RATA implementation is
composed with VRASED, a publicly available verified hybrid
RA architecture [7], which allows us to demonstrate security.
Despite our specific implementation choices, we believe that
RATA’s concepts are also applicable to hardware-based RA
architectures; see Section VIII for an overview of types of RA
architectures.
II. DEFINITIONS & BACKGROUND
A. RA Definitions & Adversarial Model
As discussed in Section I, RA is typically realized as a
challenge-response protocol between Vrf (challenger) and Prv,
a potentially infected remote low-end device. This notion is
captured by a generic syntax for RA protocols in Definition 1.
Definition 1 specifies RA as a tuple (Request,
Attest,Verify). Request is computed by Vrf to produce
challenge Chal and send it to Prv. Attest is performed by Prv
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Definition 1 (syntax): RA is a tuple (Request, Attest,
Verify) of algorithms:
• RequestVrf→Prv( · · ·): algorithm initiated by Vrf to
request a measurement of Prv memory range AR (attested
range). As part of Request, Vrf sends a challenge Chal
to Prv.
• AttestPrv→Vrf(Chal, · · ·) : algorithm executed by Prv
upon receiving Chal from Vrf. Computes an authenticated
integrity ensuring function on AR content. It produces
attestation token H, which is returned to Vrf, possibly
accompanied by auxiliary information to be used by the
Verify algorithm (see below).
• VerifyVrf(H, Chal,M, · · ·) : algorithm executed by Vrf
upon receiving H from Prv. It verifies whether Prv’s
current AR content corresponds to some expected value
M (or one of a set of expected values). Verify outputs:
1 if H is valid, and 0 otherwise.
Note: In the parameter list, (· · · ) denotes that additional pa-
rameters might be included, depending on the specific RA
construction.
by using Chal to compute an authenticated integrity-ensuring
function (e.g., MAC) over attested memory range (denoted
by AR) and producing H, which is sent back to Vrf for
verification. For example, if Attest is implemented using a
MAC, H is computed as:
H =MACK(Chal||AR) (1)
where || denotes concatenation and K is a symmetric key
shared by Prv and Vrf. Upon receiving H, Vrf executes
algorithm Verify by checking if H corresponds to the MAC
of some expected value M .
Adversarial Model. We consider a strong RA adversary Adv
that controls entire software state of Prv, including both code
and data. Adv can modify any writable memory and read
any memory (including secrets) that is not explicitly protected
by trusted hardware. Also, Adv has full access to all Direct
Memory Access (DMA) controllers on Prv3, if present on
Prv. Physical hardware attacks are out of scope of this paper:
we assume that Adv can not alter any hardware components,
modify code in ROM, induce hardware faults, or retrieve Prv
secrets via physical side-channels. Protection against physical
attacks is orthogonal and attainable via standard tamper-
resistance techniques [16].
B. Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
Computer-aided formal verification typically involves three
basic steps: First, the system of interest (e.g., hardware,
software, communication protocol) is described using a formal
model, e.g., a Finite State Machine (FSM). Second, properties
that the model should satisfy are formally specified. Third, the
system model is checked against formally specified properties
to guarantee that it retains them. This can be achieved via
either Theorem Proving or Model Checking. In this work, we
use the latter to verify the implementation of system modules.
In one instantiation of model checking, properties are
specified as formulae using Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) and
3DMA allows direct access and modification of main memory (e.g., RAM,
flash or ROM) without going through the CPU.
system models are represented as FSMs. Hence, a system
is represented by a triple (S, S0, T ), where S is a finite set
of states, S0 ⊆ S is the set of possible initial states, and
T ⊆ S × S is the transition relation set – it describes the set
of states that can be reached in a single step from each state.
The use of LTL to specify properties allows representation of
expected system behavior over time.
In addition to propositional connectives, such as conjunc-
tion (∧), disjunction (∨), negation (¬), and implication (→),
LTL includes temporal connectives, thus enabling sequential
reasoning. In this paper, we are interested in the following
temporal connectives:
• Xφ – neXt φ: holds if φ is true at the next system state.
• Fφ – Future φ: holds if there exists a future state where
φ is true.
• Gφ – Globally φ: holds if for all future states φ is true.
• φ U ψ – φ Until ψ: holds if there is a future state where
ψ holds and φ holds for all states prior to that.
• φ W ψ – φ Weak until ψ: holds if, assuming a future state
where ψ holds, φ holds for all states prior to that. If ψ
never becomes true, φ must hold forever. More formally:
φWψ ≡ (φUψ) ∨G(φ)
C. Formally Verified RA
VRASED [7] is a formally verified hybrid RA architec-
ture, based on a hardware/software co-design. It is built as
a set of sub-modules, each guaranteeing a specific set of
sub-properties. Each sub-module (hardware or software) is
individually verified. Finally, composition of all sub-modules
is proved to satisfy formal definitions of RA soundness and se-
curity. Informally, RA soundness guarantees that an integrity-
ensuring function (HMAC in VRASED’s case) is correctly
computed over attested memory range (AR). It also guarantees
that AR can not be modified after the start ofRA computation,
thus enforcing temporal consistency and protecting against
“hide-and-seek” attacks during RA computation [17]. RA
security ensures that RA execution generates an unforgeable
authenticated memory measurement and that K used in com-
puting this measurement is not leaked before, during, or after,
attestation.
To achieve its aforementioned goals, VRASED’s software
part (SW-Att) resides in Read-Only Memory (ROM) and
relies on a formally verified HMAC implementation from
the HACL* cryptographic library [18]. A typical SW-Att
execution proceeds as follows:
1) Read challenge Chal from a fixed memory region denoted
by MR.
2) Use a Key Derivation Function (KDF) to derive a one-
time key from Chal and the attestation master key K:
KDF (K,MR) (where MR = Chal).
3) Attest’s implementation (SW-Att) generates attestation
token H by computing an HMAC over an attested
memory region AR using the newly derived key:
H = HMAC(KDF (K,MR), AR)
4) Overwrite MR with the result H and return execution to
unprivileged software, i.e, the normal application(s).
VRASED’s Hardware (HW-Mod) monitors 7 MCU signals:
• PC: Current Program Counter value;
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• Ren: Signal that indicates if the MCU is reading from
memory (1-bit);
• Wen: Signal that indicates if the MCU is writing to
memory (1-bit);
• Daddr: Address for an MCU memory access;
• DMAen: Signal that indicates if Direct Memory Access
(DMA) is currently enabled (1-bit);
• DMAaddr: Memory address being accessed by DMA.
• irq: Signal that indicates if an interrupt is happening (1-
bit);
These signals determine a one-bit reset signal output, that,
when set to 1, triggers an immediate system-wide MCU reset,
i.e., before execution of the next instruction. The reset output
is triggered when VRASED’s hardware detects any violation
of security properties. VRASED’s hardware is described in
Register Transfer Level (RTL) using Finite State Machines
(FSMs). Then, NuSMV Model Checker [19] is used to au-
tomatically prove that FSMs achieve claimed security sub-
properties. Finally, the proof that the conjunction of hardware
and software sub-properties implies end-to-end soundness and
security is done using an LTL theorem prover. More formally,
Definition 2: VRASED’s Security Game (Adapted from [7])
Notation:
- l is the security parameter and |K| = |Chal| = |MR| = l
- AR(t) denotes the content of AR at time t
RA-game:
1) Setup: Adv is given oracle access to Attest (SW-Att)
calls.
2) Challenge: A challenge Chal is generated by calling
Request (Definition 1) and given to Adv.
3) Response: Adv responds with a pair (M,σ), where σ
is either forged by Adv, or is the result of calling Attest
(Definition 1), at some arbitrary time t.
4) Adv wins iff M 6= AR(t) and σ =
HMAC(KDF (K, Chal),M).
Note: If, as a part ofAttest, AR attestation is preceded by a procedure
to authenticate Vrf, t defined in step 3 is the time immediately after
successful authentication, when AR attestation in fact starts.
VRASED end-to-end security proof guarantees that no prob-
abilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary can win the RA
security game in Definition 2 with non-negligible probability
in the security parameter l, i.e., Pr[Adv,RA-game] ≤ negl(l).
D. MCU Assumptions
Since we implement RATA on top of VRASED, we adopt
the same machine model without additional assumptions. In
particular, we assume that the MCU architecture correctly
implements its specifications. Below, we review VRASED
axioms relevant to RATA:
A1 – Program Counter (PC): PC always contains the address
of the instruction being executed in a given CPU cycle.
A2 – Memory Address: Whenever memory is read or written,
a data-address signal (Daddr) contains the address of the
corresponding memory location. For a read access, a data read-
enable bit (Ren) must be set, while, for a write access, a data
write-enable bit (Wen) must be set.
A3 – DMA: Whenever the DMA controller attempts to access
the main system memory, a DMA-address signal (DMAaddr)
reflects the address of the memory location being accessed
and a DMA-enable bit (DMAen) must be set. DMA can not
access memory when DMAen is off (logical zero).
A4 – MCU Reset: At the end of a successful reset routine,
all registers (including PC) are set to zero before resuming
normal software execution flow. Resets are handled by the
MCU in hardware. Thus, the reset handling routine can not
be modified. When a reset happens, the corresponding reset
signal is set. The same signal is also set when the MCU
initializes for the first time.
III. RA TOCTOU
This section defines the notion of TOCTOU-Security in the
context of RA. We start by formalizing this notion using a
security game. Next, we consider the practicality of this prob-
lem and overview existing mechanisms, arguing that they do
not achieve TOCTOU-Security (neither according to TOCTOU-
Security definition nor in practice) and incur high overhead.
A. Notation
We first summarize our notation in Table I. We keep
it mostly consistent with that in VRASED [7], with a few
additional elements to denote RATA-specific memory regions
and signals. To simplify the notation, when the value of a
given signal (e.g., Daddr) is within a certain range (e.g.,
AR = [ARmin, ARmax]), we write that Daddr ∈ AR, i.e.:
Daddr ∈ AR ≡ ARmin ≤ Daddr ≤ ARmax (2)
In conformance with axioms discussed in Section II-D, we use
Mod Mem(x) to denote a modification to memory address
address x. Given our machine model, the following logical
equivalence holds:
Mod Mem(x) ≡ (Wen ∧Daddr = x) ∨ (DMAen ∧DMAaddr = x)
(3)
this captures the fact that a memory modification can be caused
by either the CPU (reflected in signals Wen = 1 and Daddr =
x) or by the DMA (signals DMAen = 1 and DMAaddr = x).
We also use this notation to represent a modification to an
address within a contiguous memory region R as:
Mod Mem(R) ≡ (Wen ∧Daddr ∈ R) ∨ (DMAen ∧DMAaddr ∈ R)
(4)
This notation simplifies exposition of system specifications and
FSMs in Sections IV and V.
B. TOCTOU-Security Definition
Definition 3 captures the notion of TOCTOU-Security. In it,
the game formalizes the threat model discussed in Section II-C,
where Adv controls Prv’s entire software state, including the
ability to invoke Attest at will. The game starts with the
challenger (Vrf) choosing a time t0. At a later time (tatt),
Adv receives Chal and wins the game if it can produce HAdv
that is accepted by Verify as a valid response for expected
AR value M , when, in fact, there was a time between t0 and
tatt when AR 6=M .
This definition augments RA security (Definition 2) to
incorporate TOCTOU attacks, by additionally allowing Adv
to win if it can produce the expected response and AR was
modified at any point after t0, where t0 is chosen by Vrf.
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TABLE I. NOTATION
VRASED Notation [7] (subset)
PC Current Program Counter value
Ren Signal that indicates if the MCU is reading from memory (1-
bit)
Wen Signal that indicates if the MCU is writing to memory (1-bit)
Daddr Address for an MCU memory access
DMAen Signal that indicates if DMA is currently enabled (1-bit)
DMAaddr Memory address being accessed by DMA, if any
irq Signal that indicates if an interrupt is happening
CR Memory region where SW-Att is stored: CR =
[CRmin, CRmax]
MR (MAC Region) Memory region in which SW-Att computation
result is written: MR = [MRmin,MRmax]. The same
region is also used to pass the attestation challenge as input to
SW-Att
AR (Attested Region) Memory region to be attested. Can be
fixed/predefined or specified in an authenticated request from
Vrf: AR = [ARmin, ARmax]
reset A 1-bit signal that reboots/resets the MCU when set to 1
RATA Notation
LMT (Latest Modification Time) Memory region that stores a times-
tamp/challenge corresponding to the last AR modification
CRAuth The first instruction in VRASED’s SW-Att that is executed
after successful authentication of Vrf’s request.
setLMT (RATAA) A 1-bit signal overwrites LMT with the current
RTC time, when set to logical 1.
UPLMT (RATAB ) A 1-bit signal overwrites LMT with the content
of MR when set to logical 1.
Definition 3:
3.1 RA-TOCTOU Security Game: Challenger plays the fol-
lowing game with Adv:
1) Challenger chooses time t0.
2) Adv is given full control over Prv software state and
oracle access to Attest calls.
3) At time tatt > t0, Adv is presented with Chal.
4) Adv wins if and only if it can produce HAdv, such that:
Verify(HAdv, Chal,M, · · · ) = 1 (5)
and
∃t0≤ti≤tatt{AR(ti) 6=M} (6)
where AR(ti) denotes the content of AR at time ti.
3.2 RA-TOCTOU Security Definition: An RA scheme is
considered TOCTOU-Secure if – for all PPT adversaries Adv –
there exists a negligible function negl, such that:
Pr[Adv,RA-TOCTOU-game] ≤ negl(l)
where l is the security parameter.
For example, if Vrf wants to know if AR remained in a valid
state for the past two hours, Vrf chooses t0 as t0 = tatt− 2h.
Note that this definition also captures security against transient
attacks in which Adv changes modified memory back to its
expected state and leaves the device, thus attempting to hide its
ephemeral modification from the upcoming attestation request.
This attack is undetectable by all RA schemes that are not
TOCTOU-Secure.
C. TOCTOU-Secure RA vs. Consecutive Self-Measurements
RA schemes based on consecutive self-measurements [9],
[20] attempt to detect transient malware that comes and goes
between two successive RA measurements. The strategy is for
Prv to intermittently (based on some either periodic or unpre-
dictable schedule) and unilaterally invoke its RA functionality.
Then, either Prv self-reports to Vrf [20], or Prv accumulates
measurements locally and waits for Vrf to explicitly request
them [9]. Upon receiving RA response(s), Vrf checks for
malware presence at the time of each RA measurement. Time
intervals used in these RA schemes are depicted in Figure 2.
Time
Memory
Integrity
Attest.
Compute.
Vulnerability Windows
Capp Capp Capp CappCRA CRA CRA
Fig. 2. Consecutive Self-Measurements
Note that consecutive measurements always leave time
gaps when transient malware presence would not be detected.
The only way to detect all transient malware with self-
measurement schemes is to invoke RA functionality on Prv
with a sufficiently high frequency such that the fastest possible
transient malware can not come and go undetected. However,
even if it were easy (which it is not) to determine such
“sufficiently high frequency”, as we show below, doing this
is horrendously costly. We define CPU utilization (U ) in a
consecutive scheme as the percentage of CPU cycles that can
be used by a regular application (Capp), i.e, cycles other than
those spent on self-measurements (CRA):
U =
Capp
Capp + CRA
(7)
As discussed above, guaranteed detection of transient malware
via consecutive self-measurements requires that:
Capp < CAdv (8)
where CAdv is the hypothetical number of instruction cycles
used by the fastest transient malware, capable of infecting Prv,
performing its tasks, and erasing itself. To illustrate this point,
we assume a conservative number for CAdv to be 106 cycles.
In this case:
CAdv = 106 =⇒ Capp < 106 =⇒ U < 10
6
106 + CRA
(9)
For example with CRA, consider the number of CPU cycles
required by VRASED (other hybrid RA architectures, e.g., [4],
have similar costs) to attest a program memory of 4KB:
CRA = 3.6×106 CPU cycles (about half a second in a typical
8MHz low-end MCU).
U <
106
106 + 3.6× 106 =⇒ U < 21.74% (10)
To detect transient malware, a large fraction of CPU cycles
(almost 80% in this toy example) is spent on RA computation.
In practice, it is hard to determine CAdv and in some cases
(e.g., changing a general-purpose input/output value to trigger
actuation) it is likely to be much less than 106 cycles, resulting
in even lower CPU utilization left for legitimate applications
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running on Prv. Therefore, detection of all transient malware
using consecutive self-measurements is impractical. This also
applies to the case where the interval between successive mea-
surements is variable and/or randomly selected from a range
[0, tmax]. As discussed in [20], this is because, to achieve
negligible probability of malware evasion tmax < CAdv.
Time
Memory
Integrity
Attest.
Compute.
TOCTOU Secure
Capp Capp CappCRA CRA
Fig. 3. TOCTOU-Secure RA
As shown in Figure 3, TOCTOU-Secure RA (per Defi-
nition 3) allows Vrf to ascertain memory integrity indepen-
dently from the time between successive RA measurements,
regardless of transient malware’s speed. In the next sections,
we propose two TOCTOU-Secure techniques and show their
security with respect to Definition 3.
IV. RATAA: RTC-BASED TOCTOU-SECURE TECHNIQUE
In hybrid RA, trusted software (SW-Att) is usually respon-
sible for generating the authenticated RA response (H) and
all semantic information therein. Meanwhile, trusted hardware
(HW-Mod) is responsible for ensuring that SW-Att executes as
expected, preventing leakage of its cryptographic secrets, and
handling unexpected or malicious behavior during execution.
To address TOCTOU, we propose a paradigm shift by allowing
(formally verified) HW-Mod to also provide some context about
Prv’s memory state.
We now overview RATAA– a simple technique that re-
quires Prv to have a reliable read-only Real-Time Clock (RTC)
synchronized with Vrf. Admittedly, RTCs are not readily
available on low-end MCUs and secure clock synchronization
in distributed systems is challenging [21], [22], [23], especially
for low-end embedded systems [24], [25]. Nonetheless, we
start with this simple approach to show the main idea behind
TOCTOU-Secure RA. Next, Section V proposes an alternative
that removes the RTC requirement, as long as Vrf requests
are authenticated by Prv. Note that Vrf authentication [26]
is already included in some current hybrid RA architectures,
including VRASED.
A. RATAA: Design
RATAA is illustrated in Figure 4; it is designed as a
verified hardware module behaving as follows:
1) It monitors a set of CPU signals and detects whenever
any location within AR is written. This is achieved by
checking the value of signals Daddr, Wen, DMAaddr,
and DMAen (see Section II-C). These signals allow for
detection of memory modifications either by CPU or by
DMA.
2) Whenever a modification to AR is detected, RATAA logs
the timestamp by reading the current time from the RTC
MCU CORE
VRASED
RATA
HW-Mod
PC,
irq,
Ren,
Wen,
Daddr,
DMAen,
DMAaddr reset
LMT
Program
Memory
Fig. 4. RATA module in the overall system architecture
and storing it in a fixed memory location, called Latest
Modification Time (LMT ).
3) In the memory layout, LMT ∈ AR. Also, RATAA
enforces that LMT is always read-only for all software
executing on the MCU, and for DMA.
Note that, by enforcing LMT ∈ AR, the attestation result
H = HMAC(KDF (K,MR), AR) includes the authenticated
value of LMT – the time corresponding to the latest modifica-
tion of AR. As part of the Verify algorithm, Vrf compares this
information with the time of the last authorized modification
(t0) of AR to check whether any unauthorized modification
occurred since then. The general idea is further specified in
Construction 1, which shows how RATAA can be seamlessly
integrated into VRASED, enforcing two additional properties
in hardware to obtain TOCTOU-Security. These properties are
formalized in LTL in Equations 11 and 12 of Construction 1.
B. RATAA: Security
We show that Construction 1 is secure as long as RATAA
implementation adheres to LTL statements in Equations 11
and 12. This verification is discussed in Section IV-C. The
cryptographic proof is by reduction from VRASED security
(per Definition 2) to TOCTOU-Security (per Definition 3)
of Construction 1. For its part, VRASED is shown secure
according to Definition 2 as long as HMAC is a secure
(existentially unforgeable [27]) MAC. See [7] for details.
Theorem 1: Construction 1 is TOCTOU-Secure ac-
cording to Definition 3 as long as VRASED is secure
according to Definition 2.
Proof: By contradiction, assume a polynomial Adv
that wins the game in Definition 3 with probability
Pr[Adv,RA-TOCTOU-game] > negl(l). Therefore, Adv can
produce tLMT ||HAdv such that:
VerifyVrf(HAdv, Chal,M, t0, tLMT) = 1
and
∃t0≤ti≤tatt{AR(ti) 6=M}
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Construction 1 (RATAA): Suppose LMT is the program memory region within AR (LMT ∈ AR):
• RequestVrf→Prv(): Vrf generates a random l-bits challenge Chal← ${0, 1}l and sends it to Prv.
• AttestPrv→Vrf(Chal): Call VRASED SW-Att’s RA function to compute H = HMAC(KDF (K, Chal), AR). The
resulting H is sent to Vrf along with the value stored in LMT , denoted tLMT . At all times, RATAA hardware to
enforces the following invariants:
– LMT is read-only to software:
Formal statement (LTL): G{Mod Mem(LMT )→ reset} (11)
– LMT is overwritten with the current time from RTC if, and only if, AR is modified:
Formal statement (LTL): G{Mod Mem(AR)↔ setLMT } (12)
where reset is a 1-bit signal that triggers an immediate reset of the MCU, and setLMT is a 1-bit output signal of
RATAA controlling the value of LMT reserved memory. Whenever setLMT = 1, LMT is updated with the current
value from the real-time clock (RTC). LMT maintains its previous value otherwise.
• VerifyVrf(H, Chal,M, t0, tLMT): t0 is an arbitrary time chosen by Vrf, as in Definition 3. Upon receiving tLMT ||H
Vrf checks:
tLMT < t0 (13)
H ≡ HMAC(KDF (K,MR),M) (14)
where M value of AR, as expected by Vrf. In expected M , the value corresponding to LMT is set to tLMT , as
received from Prv. Verify returns 1 if and only if both checks succeed.
By definition, Verify in Construction 1 results in 1 only
if tLMT < t0. If Adv simply replies with the actual value
tLMT = LMT ≥ ti, Verify result would be 0, since ti ≥ t0,
failing to satisfy Verify condition: tLMT < t0. Thus, to obtain
Verify = 1,Adv must spoof the value of tLMT to tLMT < t0.
Upon receiving the spoofed value of tLMT the Verify now
expects:
HAdv ≡ HMAC(KDF (K,MR),M) (15)
where expected M reflects LMT = tLMT , i.e., LMT < t0.
In addition, note that hardware enforced properties 11
and 12 guarantee that LMT ∈ AR always contains the time of
the most recent modification of AR. Thus, because tatt ≥ ti,
it must be the case that AR(tatt) will reflect LMT ≥ ti
implying LMT 6= tLMT and consequently AR(tatt) 6=M .
Under such restriction, Adv ability to win the
game implies the capability to produce HAdv such
that VerifyVrf(H, Chal,M, t0, tLMT) = 1, even though
modifying AR such that AR(tatt) = M is not possible. To
conclude the proof, we show that the existence of such an
Adv implies the existence of another adversary AdvRA that
wins the RA security game in Definition 2 against VRASED,
contradicting the theorem’s assumption.
To win the game in Definition 2AdvRA behaves as follows:
1) At time ti where t0 ≤ ti ≤ tatt, AdvRA modifies AR
causing LMT ∈ AR to store the value of ti.
2) AdvRA receives Chal from the challenger in step (2) of
RA security game of Definition 2 and executes the same
algorithm of Adv with inputs Chal and tatt = t to produce
HAdv, such that VerifyVrf(HAdv, Chal,M, t0, tLMT) =
1 with probability:
Pr[Adv,RA-TOCTOU-game] > negl(l),
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Fig. 5. RATAA FSM for RTC-based TOCTOU-secure RA
even though tLMT < t0 < ti.
3) As a response in step 3 of the game in Definition 2,
AdvRA replies with: σ = HAdv.
Since VerifyVrf(HAdv, Chal,M, t0, tLMT) = 1, it follows
that σ = HAdv = HMAC(KDF (K,MR),M), for expected
M containing LMT = tLMT . However, due to the AR
modification at time ti, AR(t) must reflect LMT ≥ ti,
satisfying the condition that AR(t) 6=M and allowing AdvRA
to win the game in Definition 2 with probability:
Pr[Adv,RA-game] = Pr[Adv,RA-TOCTOU-game] > negl(l)
(16)
C. RATAA: Implementation & Verification
Construction 1 (and respective security proof) assumes that
properties in Equations 11 and 12 are enforced by RATAA.
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Figure 5 shows a formally verified FSM corresponding to this
implementation. It enforces two properties of Equations 11
and 12. This FSM is implemented as a Mealy machine, where
output changes anytime based on both the current state and
current input values. The FSM takes as an input a subset of
signals, shown in Figure 4, and produces two 1-bit outputs:
reset to trigger an immediate reset and setLMT to control
the value of LMT memory (see Construction 1). reset is
1 whenever FSM transitions to RESET state and while it
remains in that state; it remains 0 otherwise. Whereas, setLMT
is 1 when FSM transitions to Mod state, and becomes 0
whenever it transitions out of Mod state. setLMT = 0 in all
other cases.
The FSM works by monitoring write access to LMT
and transitioning to RESET whenever such attempt happens.
When the system is running (i.e., reset = 0), FSM also moni-
tors write access to AR and transitions to Mod state whenever
it happens. The FSM transitions back to NotMod state if AR
is not being modified. We design the FSM in Verilog HDL
and automatically translate into SMV using Verilog2SMV [28].
Finally, we use NuSMV model checker [19] to automatically
prove that the FSM complies with invariants 11 and 12. The
implementation and correspondent verification are available
in [14].
Remark: The ability to cause a reset by attempting to write
to LMT does not give Adv any advantage, as any bare-metal
software (including malware) can always trigger resets on
unmodified low-end devices, for instance, by inducing software
faults.
V. RATAB : CLOCKLESS TOCTOU-SECURE RA
TECHNIQUE
We now describe RATAB – a TOCTOU-Secure approach
that requires no clock on Prv. We aim to apply the ideas
from RATAA by using hardware to convey authenticated
information about the time of the latest memory modification as
part of the attestation result. However, lack of RTC prevents
any notion of “time” on Prv’s end. To cope with this, we
rely on Vrf to convey information tied to a given point in
time, according to Vrf’s own local clock. This is done as a
part of RA Request algorithm. In fact, RATAB uses the
attestation challenge (Chal) itself in this task, taking advantage
of the fact that Chal is unique per Request and is available in
anyRA technique, thus incurring no additional communication
overhead. Security of RATAB is tightly coupled with authen-
tication of Vrf Request, which is already part of VRASED
architecture [7] (see Appendix A for details).
A. RATAB – Design
The design of RATAB remains consistent with Figure 4.
RATAB monitors the same set of MCU signals as RATAA
and also works by overwriting the special memory region
LMT ∈ AR. However, instead of logging an RTC timestamp
to LMT , it logs Chal, which was sent by Vrf as a part of
its Request and given as input to Attest(Chal, ...). LMT
is overwritten with the currently received Chal if and only
if, a modification of AR occurred since the previous Attest
instance. In summary, RATAB security relies on the following
properties, enforced by its verified hardware implementation
(see Section V-C):
• Similar to RATAA, no software running on Prv can over-
write LMT , i.e., LMT is only modifiable by RATAB
hardware.
• An update to LMT is triggered only immediately after a
successful authentication during Attest computation.
• The first successful authentication happening after a mod-
ification of AR always causes LMT to be updated with
the current value of Chal which is stored in MR. (Recall
from Table I that MR is the memory location from which
Attest reads the value of Chal.)
Let Chal1 and H1 denote the attestation challenge and response
successfully sent/received by Vrf, respectively. Vrf interprets
RA results as follows: if H1 is a valid response, i.e., it
corresponds to the expected AR value, time t1 when such
response is received is saved locally by Vrf, associated to
Chal1. In subsequent attestation results (H2, H3, ...), Vrf
checks the value of LMT for correspondence with Chal1. If
LMT 6= Chal1, Vrf learns that AR was modified after t1. This
stems from RATAB verified module, which guarantees that
LMT is always overwritten with the newly received challenge
if a TOCTOU happens between consecutive calls to Attest.
We highlight the following observations:
• Authentication of Vrf Request is instrumental to
RATAB security. Without it, Adv can simply choose
ChalAdv and call Attest(ChalAdv) after an unauthorized
modification of AR, thus setting LMT = ChalAdv of its
choice. By choosing ChalAdv as a value previously used
by Vrf, Adv can easily convince Vrf that no TOCTOU
occurred between measurements. In other words, lack of
Request authentication allows Adv to modify LMT at
will, rendering write protection of LMT useless.
• Uniqueness of LMT must be enforced, e.g., by hav-
ing Vrf randomly sample Chal from a sufficiently large
space or use Chal as a monotonically increasing counter,
depending on specifics of Request algorithm. If Chal
is reused after n instances of Request, Adv can wait
for the n-th authentic Request to complete, infect Prv,
perform its tasks, and leave Prv before the (n + 1)-st
Request occurs (with a reused Chal), resulting in a
valid response and compromised TOCTOU-Security. For
example, if we use LMT as a dirty-bit (instead of Chal),
security can be subverted in two Request-s, even if they
are properly authenticated.
RATAB is specified in Construction 2. Its hardware module
controls the value of a 1-bit signal UPLMT . When set to
1, UPLMT updates LMT with the current value of MR;
otherwise, LMT maintains its current value. RATAB hard-
ware detects successful authentication of Vrf by checking
whether the program counter PC points to the instruction
reached immediately after successful authentication. Note that
the instruction at location CRauth is never reached unless
authentication succeeds.
B. RATAB: Security
Theorem 2: Construction 2 is TOCTOU-Secure ac-
cording to Definition 3 as long as VRASED is secure
according to Definition 2.
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Construction 2 (RATAB): Suppose LMT is a memory region within AR (i.e., LMT ∈ AR) and T is a table, initially empty, stored
by Vrf. RATAB is specified as follows:
• RequestVrf→Prv(): Vrf generates a pair [Chal,Auth] according to VRASED authentication algorithm (see Appendix A for details).
• AttestPrv→Vrf(Chal,Auth): Call VRASED SW-Att’s RA function to use Auth to authenticate Chal, and after successful
authentication, compute H = HMAC(KDF (K, Chal), AR), restricted that LMT ∈ AR, where |LMT | = |Chal|. The result H is
sent to Vrf along with the contents of LMT . To support this operation, at all times, RATAB hardware on Prv enforces the following:
– LMT is read-only to software:
Formal statement (LTL): G{Mod Mem(LMT )→ reset} (17)
– LMT is never updated without authentication:
Formal statement (LTL): G{[¬UPLMT ∧X(UPLMT )]→ X(PC = CRauth)} (18)
– Modification(s) to AR imply updating LMT in the next authenticated Attest call:
Formal statement (LTL): G{Mod Mem(AR)∨reset→ [(PC = CRauth → UPLMT )W (PC = CRmax∨reset)]} (19)
where reset is a 1-bit signal that triggers an immediate reset of the MCU, and UPLMT is a 1-bit signal that, when set to 1, replaces
the content of LMT with the current value stored in MR region (i.e., Chal). LMT maintains its previous value otherwise.
• VerifyVrf(H, Chal,M, t0, T, LMT): Upon receiving LMT ||H, Vrf will behave as follows:
1) If LMT = Chal and H ≡ HMAC(KDF (K, Chal),M) (where M is the expected AR value) add current time to T associated
to Chal and return 0;
Otherwise, proceed to step 2;
2) Use the received LMT value to search in table T.
If LMT is not present in T , return 0;
If LMT is present, set t to the time associated to LMT and proceed to step 3;
3) Check whether t ≤ t0, if not, return 0;
Otherwise, proceed to step 4;
4) Check if H ≡ HMAC(KDF (K, Chal),M), where M is the expected AR value (recall that AR includes LMT , therefore,
this check also authenticates the received value for LMT .
If this check fails, return 0;
Otherwise, proceed to step 5;
5) Add current time to T associated to Chal and return 1.
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Fig. 6. RATAB FSM for clock-less TOCTOU-secure RA
Proof of Theorem 2 follows along the same lines as that
of Theorem 1. We show that, if properties in Equations 17, 18
and 19 hold, existence of Adv that wins the TOCTOU security
game against RATAB implies the existence of another Adv
that wins RA security game against VRASED, thus contra-
dicting the initial premise. The complete proof is deferred to
Appendix B.
C. RATAB: Implementation & Verification
Proof of Theorem 2 assumes that RATAB hardware
adheres to properties in Equations 17 to 19. Figure 6 shows
RATAB implementation as an FSM formally verified to
adhere to these properties. It takes as input a subset of signals,
shown in Figure 4 and outputs two 1-bit signals: reset triggers
an immediate system-wide reset and UPLMT controls updates
to LMT region. UPLMT = 1 whenever the FSM transitions
to state UPDATE and is has value 0 in all other states.
reset = 1 whenever the FSM transitions to state RESET
and while it remains in this state; it remains 0 otherwise. The
FSM operates as follows:
1) If a software modification of LMT is attempted, FSM
triggers reset immediately, regardless of what state it is
in.
2) If no modifications are made to AR since the previous
computation of Attest, FSM remains in NotMod state.
3) At any point in time, if a modification to AR is detected,
FSM transitions to state Mod. This transition indicates
that a modification occurred, although it neither alters
any output nor modifies LMT . This is because the
information to be written to LMT (the value of Chal
in the next Request) is not available at this time.
4) When a call to Attest is made, two possible actions can
happen:
a) If FSM is in NotMod state, Attest is computed
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normally and FSM remains in the same state.
b) Otherwise, FSM stays in Mod state until condition
PC = CRauth is met, implying successful authen-
tication of Vrf Request. Then, FSM transitions to
state UPDATE causing UPLMT to be set during
the transition. Hence, LMT is overwritten with Chal
passed as a parameter to the current Attest call. Note
that update to LMT happens before the computation
of the integrity ensuring function (HMAC) over AR,
which happens in state ATTEST . Therefore, attes-
tation result H will reflect LMT = Chal as part of
AR. Once Attest is completed (PC = CRmax), FSM
transitions back to NotMod.
The same verification tool-chain discussed in Section IV-C is
used to prove that this FSM adheres to LTL statements in
Equations 17, 18, and 19.
VI. EVALUATION
Our prototype is built upon a representative of the low-end
class of devices – TI MSP430 MCU family [29]. The prototype
extends VRASED (itself built atop OpenMSP430 [15] – an
open-source implementation of MSP430) to enable TOCTOU
detection. It is synthesized and executed using Basys3 com-
modity FPGA prototyping board.
Hardware Overhead. Table II reflects the analysis of RATA
verified hardware overhead. Similar to the related work [7],
[30], [31], [32], [3], [1], we consider the hardware overhead
in terms of additional LUTs and registers. The increase in the
number of LUTs can be used as an estimate of the additional
chip cost and size required for combinatorial logic, while the
number of registers offers an estimate on the state registers
required by the sequential logic in RATA FSMs. Compared
to VRASED, the verified implementation of RATAA module
takes 4 additional registers and 13 additional LUTs, while
RATAB increases the number of LUTs and registers by 57
and 27, respectively. With respect to unmodified OpenMSP430
architecture, this represents the overhead of 1.4% LUTs and
1.4% registers for RATAA and 3.8% LUTs and 4.8% registers
for RATAB .
Runtime Overhead. Notably, RATA does not require any
modification to RA execution. It only ensures that information
about the latest modification of attested memory is factored
into the attestation result. Hence, it incurs no extra runtime
cycles or additional RAM allocation, on top of that of VRASED
architecture. In fact, as we discuss next, in Section VII, Attest
runtime can be reduced to the time to attest only LMT. The
runtime reduction is presented in Figure 8. This represents a
reduction of ≈ 10 times compared, e.g., to the number of
cycles to attest an AR of size 4KBytes. The runtime savings
increase linearly with the size of AR.
Memory Overhead. RATAA requires 128-bit of additional
storage – 64-bit for RTC and another 64-bit for LMT . RTC
is implemented using a 64-bit memory cell incremented at
every clock cycle. This guarantees that RTC does not wrap
around during Prv’s lifetime since it would take more than
70, 000 years for that to happen on MSP430 running at 8MHz
and incrementing RTC at every cycle. In RATAA, LMT
is implemented as a 64-bit memory storage and updates its
content with RTC value whenever setLMT bit is on. For
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Fig. 7. Hardware overhead. Comparison between RATA and techniques
based on self-measurements.
RATAB , the memory overhead increases to a total of 512 bits.
A 256-bit memory storage is required by the implementation of
VRASED authentication module, while another 256-bit storage
is used to implement LMT that updates its content with
Chal when applicable (as described in Section V). This small
reserved memory corresponds to 0.1% of MSP430 memory
address space (64KBytes in total).
Verification resources. We verify RATA on an Ubuntu 18.04
machine running at 3.40GHz. Results are shown in Table II.
RATAA adds 127 lines of verified Verilog code on top
of VRASED. These are needed to enforce 2 invariants in
Equations 11 and 12. RATAB incurs 182 additional lines of
verified Verilog code, needed to enforce the 3 invariants in
Equations 17, 18, and 17. Besides that, RATA verification
requires checking existing VRASED invariants. Overall veri-
fication process takes less than one second and consumes at
most 26MB of memory, making it workable on a commodity
desktop.
Comparison. We compare RATA’s hardware overhead with
that of two recent self-measurementRA techniques: SeED [20]
and ERASMUS [9]. Even though, as discussed in Sec-
tion III-C, these techniques do not achieve TOCTOU-Security
(per Definition 3), we believe them to be the most closely
related approaches to RATA. SeED extends a 32-bit Intel
architecture, which is higher-end than our target devices, i.e., a
16-bit TI MSP430. Whereas, ERASMUS was implemented on
MSP430. Figure 7 compares RATA to SeED and ERASMUS
in terms of numbers of additional LUTs and registers. RATAA
require fewer LUTs, compared to both SeED and ERASMUS.
Whereas, RATAB necessitates more registers, compared to
ERASMUS, it uses less LUTs than both self-measurements
techniques. In summary, both RATA-s incur low overhead:
< 5% increase for both LUTs and registers.
VII. USING RATA TO ENHANCE RA & RELATED
SECURITY SERVICES
A. Constant-Time RA
One notable and beneficial feature of RATA is that, most
of the time, RA no longer needs to be computed over the
entire AR, which significantly reduces RA execution time on
Prv.
10
Architecture Hardware VerificationLUT Reg Verified LoC Time (s) Memory (MB)
OpenMSP430 1849 692 - - -
VRASED 1862 698 474 0.4 13.6
RATAA 1875 702 601 0.6 19.7
RATAB 1919 725 656 0.8 26.1
TABLE II. ADDITIONAL HARDWARE AND VERIFICATION COST
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Fig. 8. Comparison of LMT attestation time Case-1) with regular attestation
of AR (Case-2), as a function of |AR|. |LMT | is 32 Bytes. Experiments
are performed on an MSP430 MCU running at 8MHz.
If Vrf already knows AR contents from a previous attes-
tation result, it suffices to show that AR was not changed
since then. This can be done by attesting LMT by itself,
instead of AR in its entirety, resulting in substantial reduction
of computation time from linear in the size of AR to constant:
|LMT |, i.e., 32 bytes.RA can be performed differently, in two
possible cases:
• Case-1: if no modification to AR happened
since the last attestation (denoted by tatt), call
Attest on LMT region only. Verify checks for
H ≡ HMAC(KDF (K, Chal), LMT ). Vrf then
learns whether AR was modified since the previous
measurement, solely based on LMT . By checking that
LMT corresponds to t0 < tatt, this result confirms
that AR remained the same in the interim. Therefore,
measuring AR again is unnecessary – doing so would
be redundant.
• Case-2: If AR was modified since the last attestation,
call Attest covering entire AR. Verify is computed
normally as described in Constructions 1 or 2, depending
on the implementation, i.e., RATAA or RATAB .
Remark: Note that Prv’s RA functionality can easily
detect whether AR was modified (in order to decide between
attesting with Case-1 or Case-2) by checking the value of
LMT , which is readable in software, though not writable.
Most of the time, Prv is expected to be in a benign state
(i.e., no malware), especially if Adv knows that its presence
is guaranteed to be detectable. In such times, size of attested
memory can be reduced reduced from several KBytes (e.g.,
when AR is the entire program memory on a low-end Prv) to
a mere 32 Bytes (LMT size), Figure 8 depicts an empirical
result on the MSP430 MCU showing how this optimization
can significantly reduce RA runtime overhead.
In the rest of this section, we discuss some implications of
this optimization, along with security improvements offered
by RATA, for different branches of RA and related security
services.
B. Atomicity & Real-Time Settings
Security of hybrid RA architectures generally depends on
temporal consistency of attested memory. Simply put, temporal
consistency means “no modifications of attested memory AR
during RA computation”. Lack thereof allows self-relocating
malware to move itself within Prv’s memory during attesta-
tion, in order to avoid detection, e.g., if malware interrupts
attestation execution, relocates itself to the part of AR that
has already been covered by the integrity-ensuring function
(HMAC in our case), and restarts attestation.
In higher-end devices, memory locking can be used to
prevent modifications until the end of attestation, as discussed
in [17]. However, in low-end devices, where applications run
on bare-metal and there is no architectural support for memory
locking, temporal consistency is attained by enforcing that
attestation software (SW-Att) runs atomically: once it starts,
it can not be interrupted by any software running on Prv,
thus preventing malware from interrupting RA and moving
itself around memory. This is the case in prominent hybrid RA
architectures, such as [4], [6], [7], [3], [33], [34], [5]. While
effective for security purposes, this requirement conflicts with
real-time requirements if Prv serves a safety-critical function.
For example, a smoke or CO2 detector should not delay
sounding an alarm because attestation is being executed.
Some prior remediation techniques proposed to enable
interrupts while maintaining temporal consistency, with high
probability. SMARM [35] is one such approach. (Others simi-
lar techniques are discussed in [36]). SMARM divides attested
memory (AR) into a set of blocks which are attested in a
randomized order. Attestation of one block remains atomic.
However, interrupts are allowed between attestation of two
blocks. Assuming that malware can not guess the index of
the next block to be attested, even if interrupts are allowed,
malware only has a certain probability of avoiding detection.
If the entire attestation procedure is repeated multiple times,
this probability can be made arbitrarily small.
We note that, given the RATA optimization discussed
in Section VII-A, attestation can be computed very quickly.
In particular, since most Pseudo Random Function (PRF)
implementations, use block sizes of at least 32 Bytes, the
atomic attestation of one block in a SMARM-type strategy
can not be made faster than the attestation on LMT in
RATA (|LMT | = 32 Bytes). In addition, attestation of
LMT provides information about the content of AR in its
entirety with no probability of evasion. We believe this makes
RATA more friendly to safety-critical operations than existing
approaches.
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In such settings, we envision that AR would be attested
in its entirety at system boot time (Case-2 in Section VII-A)
while subsequent RA would be computed on LMT only
(Case-1 in Section VII-A). We note that, if AR is eventually
modified, Prv would need to fall back into Case-2 for the
next RA computation, which takes time to run atomically.
However, after an unauthorized modification to Prv memory,
it is unclear why one would still want to offer real-time
guarantees to compromised software. On the other hand,
authorized modifications (e.g., benign software updates) could
be still occur and be scheduled outside periods of real-time
demands.
C. Collective RA Protocols and Device-to-Device Malware
Relocation
Collective RA protocols (CRA) (a.k.a. swarm attesta-
tion) [37], [38], [10], [39], [40], [41], [42] fall into a set of
techniques to attest a large number of devices that operate
together as a part of a large system. CRA schemes typically
assume hybrid RA architectures on individual devices and
look into how to attest many devices efficiently. One security
problem that is typically out of scope on single-device RA
and becomes relevant in CRA settings is caused by migratory
malware. This is an analog of intra-device self-relocating
malware (discussed in Section VII-B) that appears in collective
settings. Specifically, instead of moving around inside the
memory of the same device, it migrates from device-to-device
to avoid detection.
To guarantee detection of migratory malware, CRA result
must convince Vrf that all devices were in a safe state
within the same time window, implying that malware had no
destination device to migrate and avoid detection. Conse-
quently, if a single-device attestation result conveys a safe state
only at some point in between the execution of Request
and Verify algorithms, it is nearly impossible (specially in
the presence of network delays) to conclude that migratory
malware is not present in the swarm. This problem is discussed
at large in the CRA literature, however, existing approaches
either leave it out of their adversarial model [10], [37], [38],
[41], or make a strong assumption about clock synchronization
among all devices in the swarm [20], [39], [40], [42] such that
all devices can be scheduled to run Attest at the same time.
Construction 3 (CRA-RATA): Let S = {Prv1, ...,Prvn}
denote a swarm of n devices individually equipped with
RATAB hybrid RA facilities. Let LMTi be the value of LMT
in Prvi. Also, Verify(Prvi) denotes the verification algorithm
of Construction 2 for Prvi. Consider a simple CRA protocol in
which:
1) Vrf executes RATAB protocol, as defined in Construc-
tion 2 with each Prvi in parallel. Let t(Reqi) denote the
time when Vrf issued the request to Prvi.
2) Vrf collects all responses and computes Verify(Prvi) for
all Prvi ∈ S. It then uses the values of LMTi to learn
“since when” Prvi has been in a valid state. We denote
this time as t(LMTi).
Here we argue that, by addressing the TOCTOU problem
in the single-device setting without requiring synchronization,
RATAB can be utilized to construct the first CRA protocol
secure against migratory malware without relying on synchro-
nization of the entire swarm. To see why this is the case, con-
sider Construction 3. In this construction, the TOCTOU-secure
guarantee from individual devices allows Vrf to conclude that
each Prv was in a valid state within a fixed time interval.
Therefore, by checking for the overlap of the valid interval of
all Prv-s, Vrf can learn the time window in which the entire
swarm was safe as a whole, or detect migratory malware when
such time window does not exist. Theorem 3 states the concrete
guarantee offered by Construction 3.
Theorem 3: In Construction 3, if for all Prvi ∈ S,
Verify(Prvi) in step 2 succeeds for some t(LMTi), then it
must be the case that entire S was in a valid state in the time
window defined by the interval:
(max[t(LMT1), ..., t(LMTn)] , min[t(Req1), ..., t(Reqn)]) (20)
assuming equation 20 constitutes a valid intervala.
a(a, b) is a valid interval if a < b
Proof: (Sketch) The proof follows directly from the ob-
servations that:
• Given RA-Security, for each Prvi ∈ S, a valid response
can not be produced before the time when Prvi receives
Chal, which is strictly greater than t(Reqi).
• Given TOCTOU-Security, for each Prvi ∈ S with
Verify(Prvi) = 1, its memory could not have been
changed between t(LMTi) and the first call to Attest
after t(Reqi).
D. Runtime Attestation
Runtime attestation focus on detection of runtime attacks
providing authenticated information about software execution
on Prv. While this seems unrelated to detection of retrospec-
tive memory modifications (studied in this paper), we argue
that RATA can also offer improvements to runtime attestation
approaches.
Proofs of execution for embedded systems were recently
explored in [3] (APEX). They are used to prove that a remote
Prv executed the expected code and to authenticate that out-
puts were indeed produced by this execution and could no have
been spoofed or modified. Control Flow Attestation (CFA),
introduced in [2] (C-FLAT), allows Vrf to verify whether
software executed on Prv took a specific (or set of) valid
control path(s).
We note that regular (or static) RA (allowing measurement
of memory content) is a common stepping stone in these
respective functionalities. In C-FLAT, the executable must be
instrumented with specific instructions to enable CFA and RA
is used to verify that such instructions were not removed
or modified. Besides, executions with the same control flow
path can have different behaviors if their instructions differ. In
APEX, execution is proved to Vrf with attestation of execution
metadata. However, without attesting the corresponding exe-
cutable in program memory, this proof would have no meaning
other than “some code executed successfully”.
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In many runtime attestation applications, the same code
is expected to remain in memory for long periods, while its
proper execution (or control flow) must be verified repeatedly.
This case happens, for instance, in one of the main moti-
vations for proofs of execution in APEX: building IoT/CPS
sensors that (even if infected) can not lie about their sensed
quantities. Hence, proofs of execution for the same executable
(implementing the sensing task) should be provided along with
each execution (whenever the sensing task is performed). It
is not hard to imagine similar cases for CFA. In all such
cases, RATA can be used to reduce the overhead involved
on the RA computation of successive runtime attestations. In
APEX specific example, all runtime overhead vis-a-vis cost
of executing the same software without proving its execution
to Vrf, is caused by the cost of RA. We believe that the
optimization discussed in Section VII-A can bring significant
improvement to this and similar applications.
VIII. RELATED WORK
– Remote Attestation (RA):RA techniques generally fall into
three categories: hardware-based, software-based and hybrid.
Hardware-based techniques [43], [8], [44], [45] either perform
RA using a dedicated autonomous hardware component (e.g.,
a TPM [8]), or require substantial changes to the underlying
instruction set architecture in order to support execution of
trusted software (e.g., SGX [46]). Such changes are too
expensive for cost-sensitive low-end embedded devices. On
the other end of the spectrum, software-based techniques [47],
[48], [49] require no hardware security features; they perform
RA using a custom checksum function implemented entirely
in software. Security of software-based techniques relies on
a precise measurement timings, which is only applicable to
settings where the communication delay between Vrf and Prv
is negligible and/or constant, e.g., communication between
peripherals and a host CPU. Thus, software-based RA is
unsuitable for environments where RA must be performed
over the internet. Whereas, hybrid RA is particularly suitable
for low-end embedded devices. It provides the same security
guarantees as hardware-based RA, while minimizing modi-
fications to underlying MCU hardware. Current hybrid RA
techniques [4], [5], [6], [7], [11], [33] implement the integrity-
ensuring function (e.g., MAC) in software, and use trusted
hardware to control execution of this software, preventing any
violations that might causeRA security problems, e.g., gadget-
based attacks [50] or key leakage. This paper represents a
paradigm shift of hybrid RA, by having trusted hardware
additionally providing some context about Prv’s memory state.
– Temporal Aspects of RA: Besides TOCTOU, two other
temporal aspects are essential for RA security: First, temporal
consistency [17] means guaranteeing that theRA result reflects
an instantaneous snapshot of Prv’s attested memory at some
point in time during RA. Lack thereof allows self-relocating
malware to escape detection by copying and/or erasing itself
during RA. Temporal consistency is achieved by enforcing
atomic (uninterruptible) execution of attestation code, or by
locking attested memory (i.e., making it unmodifiable) dur-
ing RA execution. Second, when RA is used on safety-
critical and/or real-time devices [36], atomicity requirement
might interfere with the real-time nature of Prv’s application.
To address this issues, SMARM [35] relaxes this require-
ment by using probabilistic malware detection. Meanwhile,
ERASMUS [9] and SeED [20] are based on Prv’s self-
measurements, in order to detect transient malware that infects
Prv and leaves before the next RA instance. See Section III-C
for further discussion on these types of techniques.
– Formal Verification and RA: Formal verification provides
significantly higher level of assurance for hardware and soft-
ware implementations. It yields provable security for protocol
specifications and for the implementation thereof. Therefore,
in recent years, several efforts focused on formal verification
of security-critical services and systems [51], [52], [18],
[53], [54], [55]. VRASED [7] realized a formally verified RA
architecture targeting low-end devices. Other formally verified
security services were obtained by extending VRASED to
derive remote proofs of software update, memory erasure and
system-wide MCU reset [1]. Another recent result is APEX –
a formally verified VRASED-based architecture for proofs of
remote software execution with authenticated outputs [3]. In
this work, we also use VRASED RA architecture as the base
and modify it to provide TOCTOU security while retaining its
original guarantees. Using VRASED allows us to reason about
RATA design and to formally verify its security properties.
However, RATA’s main concepts are applicable to other
hybrid (and possibly hardware-based) RA architectures.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we design, prove security of, and formally
verify two designs (RATAA and RATAB) to secure RA
against TOCTOU-related attacks. RATAA and RATAB mod-
ules are formally specified and verified using a model-checker.
They are also composed with VRASED – a verified RA
architecture. We show that this composition is TOCTOU-secure
using a reduction-based cryptographic proof. We also describe
working prototypes of RATAA and RATAB . Our evaluation
demonstrates that a TOCTOU-Secure design is affordable even
for cost-sensitive low-end embedded devices.
Possible directions for future work include the implemen-
tation of RATA in different types of RA architectures (e.g.,
hardware-based ones, such as SANCUS [45]) and the develop-
ment of different approaches to tackle the TOCTOU problem.
It would also be interesting to analyze what other security
services that build on top ofRA could be optimized by RATA
capability. Finally, we believe that further investigation could
result in more techniques to tackle TOCTOU in the context of
RA, with different sets of requirements and guarantees.
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1 void Hacl HMAC SHA2 256 hmac entry ( ) {
2 u i n t 8 t key [ 6 4 ] = {0};
3 u i n t 8 t v e r i f i c a t i o n [ 3 2 ] = {0};
4 if (memcmp(CHALL ADDR, CTR ADDR, 32) > 0)
5 {
6 memcpy ( key , KEY ADDR, 64) ;
7
8 hacl hmac ( ( u i n t 8 t * ) v e r i f i c a t i o n , ( u i n t 8 t * ) key ,
9 ( u i n t 3 2 t ) 64 , * ( ( u i n t 8 t * )CHALL ADDR) ,
10 ( u i n t 3 2 t ) 32) ;
11
12 if ( ! memcmp(VRF AUTH, v e r i f i c a t i o n , 32)
13 {
14 hacl hmac ( ( u i n t 8 t * ) key , ( u i n t 8 t * ) key ,
15 ( u i n t 3 2 t ) 64 , ( u i n t 8 t * ) v e r i f i c a t i o n ,
16 ( u i n t 3 2 t ) 32) ;
17 hacl hmac ( ( u i n t 8 t * ) MAC ADDR, ( u i n t 8 t * ) key ,
18 ( u i n t 3 2 t ) 32 , ( u i n t 8 t * ) ATTEST DATA ADDR,
19 ( u i n t 3 2 t ) ATTEST SIZE ) ;
20 memcpy (CTR ADDR, CHALL ADDR, 32) ;
21 }
22 }
23
24 return ( ) ;
25 }
Fig. 9. SW-Att Implementation with Vrf authentication [7].
APPENDIX
A – Vrf AUTHENTICATION DETAILS
To prevent an adversary from impersonating Vrf and
sending fake attestation requests to Prv, VRASED design
supports authentication of Vrf as part of SW-Att execution.
The implementation is based on the protocol in [34]. In this
protocol, Chal is chosen by Vrf as a monotonically increasing
nonce. As such, for subsequent requests i and i+1, it is always
the case that Chali < Chali+1.
Figure 9 shows VRASED C implementation of SW-Att,
including Vrf authentication. It also builds upon HACL*
verified HMAC to authenticate Vrf, in addition to comput-
ing the authenticated integrity check over AR. In this case,
Vrf’s request additionally contains an HMAC of the challenge
computed using K. Before calling SW-Att, software running
on Prv is expected to store the received challenge on a fixed
address CHALL ADDR and the corresponding received
HMAC on V RF AUTH . SW-Att discards the attestation
request if (1) the received challenge is less than or equal to
the latest challenge, or (2) HMAC of the received challenge
is mismatched. After that, it derives a new unique key using
HKDF [56] from K and the received HMAC and uses it as
the attestation key.
To support secure authentication, VRASED extends HW-Mod
with two additional properties to make the memory region
that stores Prv’s counter immutable to untrusted applications
(any software except SW-Att). Notably, the counter requires
persistent and writable storage, because SW-Att needs to
modify it at the end of each attestation execution.
B – PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: By contradiction, assume a polynomial Adv
that wins the game in Definition 3 with probability
Pr[Adv,RA-TOCTOU-game] > negl(l). Therefore, Adv is
able to produce response LMTAdv||HAdv such that:
VerifyVrf(HAdv, Chal,M, t0, T, LMTAdv) = 1
and
∃t0≤ti≤tatt{AR(ti) 6=M}
By definition, in Construction 2, Verify outputs 0 if
LMTAdv does not exist in table T (step number 2 in Verify).
Moreover, if LMTAdv is indeed present it must correspond to
a challenge value sent before t0 (step number 3 in Verify).
Therefore, in order to win, Adv must chose LMTAdv re-
stricted to values of challenges issued before t0.
Since LMT ∈ AR, by claiming a value for LMTAdv
fitting the restriction above, Adv causes the expected memory
value M to also reflect, LMT = LMTAdv. At this point, Adv
has two possible actions: to modify AR to call Attest with
AR(tatt) = M ; or to obtain HAdv even with AR(tatt) 6= M .
First we show that the latter is Adv’s only option.
Let us say that Adv attempts to set AR(tatt) =M to call
Attest. In this case, we highlight three observations about
RATAB :
1) By LTL statement 19, any modification to AR in between
the i-th and (i + 1)-th authenticated computations of
Attest, will cause AR to change to reflect LMT =
Chali+1 following RA responses. Therefore, the premise
that
∃t0≤ti≤tatt{AR(ti) 6=M}
will necessarily update LMT .
2) From VRASED authentication (see Appendix A), for
subsequent RA challenges Chali and Chali+1 that au-
thenticate successfully, it is always the case that Chali <
Chali+1.
3) From LTL statement 18, RATAB never updates LMT
with a challenge if it does not authenticate successfully.
Since authentication implies Chali < Chali+1, a call to
Attest never causes LMT to be updated to a previously
used Chal.
From observations 1, 2, and 3 above, it is impossible to
set AR = M by calling Attest, because any modification
to LMT caused by Attest will always change LMT to a
value that was never used before and thus not present in table
T . Now Adv last resource is to try to write to LMT directly.
However, this is immediately in conflict with LTL property 17.
Since making AR(tatt) = M is impossible after a modi-
fication at time ti, the assumption that Adv wins the game
in Definition 3 implies that Adv is able to produce HAdv
that verifies successfully even when AR(tatt) 6= M . To
conclude the proof, we show that existence of such Adv
implies existence of another adversary AdvRA that wins the
RA security game in Definition 2.
To win the game in Definition 2 AdvRA is constructed as
follows:
1) At time some ti, where t0 ≤ ti ≤ t, AdvRA modifies
memory in AR.
2) AdvRA receives Chal in step 2 of RA security game of
Definition 2, and executes the same algorithm as Adv
on Chal and with tatt = t to produce HAdv such that
VerifyVrf(HAdv, Chal,M, t0, T, LMTAdv) = 1 with
probability:
Pr[Adv,RA-TOCTOU-game] > negl(l).
3) As a response in step 3 of the game in Definition 2,
AdvRA replies with σ = HAdv.
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Since VerifyVrf(HAdv, Chal,M, t0, T, LMTAdv) = 1, it fol-
lows that σ = HMAC(KDF (K, Chal),M) (first condition
for AdvRA to win), for expected M containing LMT =
LMTAdv. On the other hand, because memory was modified at
time ti, it must be the case that AR(t) has LMT 6= LMTAdv.
Thus satisfying the remaining condition that AR(t) 6= M
implying that AdvRA wins the game in Definition 2 with
probability:
Pr[Adv,RA-game] = Pr[Adv,RA-TOCTOU-game] > negl(l)
(21)
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